New Ways of War
The Isreali use of supply-chain-contamination opens a new page in the history of Warfare
Between repeated assassination attempts against Donald Trump, the attempted genocide in Gaza, and the endless war of attrition in Ukraine, one might presume the recent cellular eruption in Lebanon is just another stage of combat. While it is another stage of 21st century combat, it has opened a can of worms so massive that most militaries are taking note. Securing your own supply chain has never been as critical as it is now.
No aspect of the new 21st century battlefield has ever been as critical as it is now.
For those who haven’t heard, the Israeli Defense Forces recently performed a fascinating attack on the personnel operating the semi-state militant organization Hezbollah. The attack consisted of several days of strikes utilizing the the targets own communications tools.
Hezbollah made heavy use of pagers and radios. A reasonable move considering that most smartphones are easily compromised at this point.
It currently appears [subject to update] that the IDF was able to license pagers and radios, construct them in Israel, and sell those tools to Hezbollah through several intermediaries… distributing small bits of contained plastic explosives among the leadership of Hezbollah that could be detonated at any time. Then the time came.
After an initial 400 or so devices were detonated, resulting in many injuries and deaths, Hezbollah switched to a set of hand-held radios. The next day, 4000 of those exploded too.
Numerous devices have been exploding all across the nation of Lebanon. A high fatality rate among the holders of those devices has made it nearly impossible for an individual to know if their electronics are safe or will kill them.
This has created a series of interesting incentives for both state actors and non-state-actors when it comes to electronic systems. Hezbollah used pagers and radios because they couldn’t trust cellphones not to be hacked for intelligence gathering. A reasonable assumption, but one that left a critical hole in the market.
A pager can’t be hacked, but if only one organization in an entire country uses a specific type of pager then it becomes very easy to target that group. So pagers and radios purchased in bulk were the obvious next-target for the IDF. Not only that, it became possible to specifically target the group in question while minimizing casualties. Public outcry would be enormous if it appeared that any cellphone could be detonated remotely at any time and thousands of grandmothers and children were accidental collateral damage. By switching to electronics that work well against digital attack, Hezbollah left themselves open to a far more visceral form of counter-insurgency strike.
Responding to New Threats
Israel has effectively shown the world that it is possible to attack militant and military organizations by attacking their supply chains. Global supply chains have made it easier than ever to modify a targets equipment before it even gets shipped. Militaries across the world have limited options when it comes to supply-chain management.
The United States military already focuses heavily on vertical-integration of supply chains; individuals at contracting companies require security clearances and chains-of-custody are maintained from initial production and final deployment. Smaller militaries, or less clearly structured militaries around the world are at radical risk due to supply-chain subversion and disruption. It appears that Taiwan has done a reasonable quantity of work on behalf of Israel and similar international interests over the last few years. Planting plastic explosives into a cellphone or a pager is quite easy, hooking it up to the circuit board for remote detonation less-so but doable.
It stands to reason that very few military operations will be safely possible for mid-scale and non-state actors. Acquiring reliable equipment that hasn’t in some way been tampered with will grow progressively more difficult. It is likely only specialists or semi-professional hobbyists will be able to identify the distinction between a real device and a modified device. In response to that, smaller state-actors and non-state actors need to start taking into accounts methods of mitigating the threat.
The easiest option, and probably the most significant for small militaries and non-state-actors is to abandon hopes of vertical supply-chain integration: it is likely only specialists or semi-professional hobbyists will be able to identify the distinction between a real device and a modified device. That means that, oddly enough, most non-state actors and small-to-medium scale militaries should look to the civilian market. Namely the fact that if there is sufficient mixing between the civilian market and the militaria market, it’ll be extremely difficult for a hostile foreign actor to target a specific group.
Targeting a large civilian market will have two extremely negative side-effects for a hostile [state] actor. The first is that collateral damage will be immense, sufficient to provide a Casus Beli. If 5000 civilians were killed as half the cellphones in a given country exploded, then that would be a number of deaths equivalent to the destruction of 9/11. It is therefore in the interest of small state and non-state actors to mix their supply chains into the civilian market rather than order specialist equipment. Particularly when it comes to communications and electronics.
The second negative side-effect for a hostile [state] actor is the fact that youtube and open-source communities exist. Rather than creating an entire department dedicated to monitoring the type of equipment purchased and ensuring its function, a small state-actor or a non-state actor can rely on the open source community to do it for them. In a nation of reasonable size (like the UK) there are large hobbyist organizations that utilize specific types of electronics. Those electronics are safe in that the open-source community is breaking them open all the time. The probability of such individuals identifying a potentially hostile modification to a device is high.
A paid bureaucrat will never be as good at his job as an enthusiastic hobbyist would be doing it on his own time.
For particularly large militaries or well funded organizations [looking at you, Blackwater], it is apparent that perfect vertical integration may be very difficult. It will be necessary then to inspect all incoming electronics. Most of the US military does this to a degree already, but those departments and sub-departments will need to grow in funding and importance. Simultaneously, this will dramatically increase logistics expenses as people are often the most expensive part of projects like this.
For non-state-actors, the solution is clear. Ensure that the equipment you use is not only available to the regular population… but is evenly distributed throughout. Additionally, focus on using devices common among open-source hobbyists who are likely to locate and make a youtube video about any identified tampering. Don’t use pagers, use cellphones with open-source privacy software and use models of those cellphones that are extremely common in the general population.
Not a perfect solution, but a functional one.
Long Term Changes in War
The most interesting long-term effect of these types of attack is the capacity for a hostile [state] actor to attack key bureaucratic components. In Lebanon, the leadership of Hezbollah was the primary target of the attack. That does not render it impossible to attack other organs of a foreign nation-state. An example of a hostile attack on the weak managerial organs of a state is given concisely by the article below. In brief, the bureaucratic organs of a state are mostly filled by lazy, entitled, and cowardly managerial types who are in no way willing to die over a few thousand dollars of tax revenue.
A targeted attack over the long-term through supply-tampering could easily cripple a nation over the course of 3 to 5 years if performed competently. This would be one of the safest ways to cripple a nation-state adversary without ever coming into direct conflict. Simply scare the managerial class with the threat of assassination or deadly cellular-device detonation so no one wants to work in that agency any more.
Eventually this type of warfare will play out, but it will be quite some time before that specific adventure is completed. The most immediate reaction is going to be a hyper-focus on supply-chain vertical-integration. Non-state-actors are going to have to mix their tools into the general population by purchasing tools off of websites like ebay, from dedicated hobbyist forums (like Meshtastic) and through so many intermediaries that it’ll be impossible to ensure that modified devices get to intended recipients.
Over the last 50 years or so, our weapons have been getting smaller and more precise rather than larger and more destructive. They key being that if you can hit the right thing, you don’t need a big bang. That’s why the United States has weapons that don’t even have explosive warheads, they’ll target a specific person in a specific seat in a moving car.
We will not see any major reform to warfare in general until two major state actors both develop the capability of crippling one another through highly targeted strikes. This would be a case of attacking not the military base with a gigantic explosive, but the managerial leadership of both realizing that they can both be assassinated by the other at any time. Imagine if every IRS agent or FBI agent in the United States suddenly keeled over dead after their pocket watch exploded.
Alternatively, what if it was every police officer in the city of Detroit?
With tools like this, hyper-targeted precision strikes against individuals embedded in specific critical institutions, it becomes possible to destroy a hostile nation-state without ever having to engage in open warfare. These tools will be used at some point in the next 50 years in all likelihood. What comes out the other side of it, however, is going to be particularly fascinating.
I suspect that, much like atomic weapons, there will be certain honor-codes that develop when it comes to warfare. A form of New Bushido code that will develop where only those who are granted the status of ‘warrior’ are subject to violent destruction.
All sorts of new military codes and honor-codes and national agreements could come out of the other side of the technological cultural ravine we’re threatening to enter. Otherwise warfare will become fractalized; attacking the enemy state organs, infrastructure, civilian populace, and even food supply by any underhanded means fathomable. It is interesting that Israel, of all nations, chose to let this particular strategic genie out of the bottle.
Hopefully we’ll see a world of honorable combat, and not one where random civilians become meaningful casualties of war due to the office they happen to be working in.
Had been on my reading list for a while. Precision warfare is very very interesting. Also liked that you linked to Hyperion. Best SciFi series ever written IMO.
Additive Manufacturing
(3D printing)